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BOOK REVIEWS 
TORT REFORM FOR A CIVILIZED 
SOCIETY? IMPLICATIONS OF TORT 
REFORM FOR TOXIC TORT LAWSUITS 
MARYA ROSE* 
A CIVIL ACTION. By JONATHAN HARR. New York: Random House. 
1995. Pp. 500. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Poor people and people of color bear a disproportionate share of 
the United States' environmental health hazards. l This tenet is the 
cornerstone of the environmental justice movement.2 Environmental 
justice, an extension of both the civil rights and the environmental 
movements, is a broad-based legal and political movement which has 
developed to relieve poor, ethnic, and minority communities of the 
burden of toxic or hazardous waste.3 The movement "is premised on 
* MANAGING EDITOR, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. This book review is 
dedicated in loving memory to my aunt, Diane Rose. From the time she moved to the Niagara 
Falls area in the 1970s, Diane contemplated the danger of living downstream from the infamous 
"Love Canal" and worried about what consequences the toxic waste at that site had on her 
children's health. In March of 1995 Diane was diagnosed with leukemia. It was Diane's illness 
that inspired me to review A Civil Action and write this article. 
1 See Sanford]. Rosen & Tom Nolan, Seeking Environmental justice for Minorities and Poor 
People, TRIAL, Dec. 1994, at 50, 50 & 54 n.l (citing UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION ON 
RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REpORT ON THE 
RACIAL AND SOCIO-EcONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMUNITIES SURROUNDING HAZARD-
OUS WASTE SITES (1987». Numerous studies have confirmed that poor minority communities 
bear a disproportionate burden of pollution. See Allan Kanner, Environmental justice, Torts and 
Causation, 34 WASHBURN LJ. 505, 505-06 (1995). According to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), polluting industries and hazardous waste dumps are most often located in pre-
dominately low-income, minority communities. See id. 
2 See Rosen & Nolan, supra note 1, at 50. 
3 See Bradford C. Mank, Environmental justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Repre-
sentation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329, 329 n.l (1995); Rosen & Nolan, supra 
note 1, at 50; Rhona]. Kisch, Book Note, Putting Environmental Racism on the National Agenda? 
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the notion that the rights of toxic contamination victims have been 
systematically usurped by more powerful social actors, and that 'justice' 
resides in the return of those rights."4 
Environmental justice, then, requires an ability to vindicate claims 
for personal injury and property damage, especially where the claims 
arise from the proximity of poor or minority communities to hazardous 
facilities. 5 Private toxic tort lawsuits provide one way to achieve this 
vindication.6 Toxic torts involve claims for actual or potential physical 
injuries, emotional distress, property damages, and economic losses 
caused by toxic substances7 in the air, ground, or water.s Toxic torts are 
often complex mass torts that involve multiple defendants and large 
classes ofvictims.9 Many toxic tort cases are brought as class action suits 
by lawyers working on a contingency fee basis. 10 The invisibility of many 
of the injuries and the relative indivisibility of harm from hazardous 
pollution often make joint and several liability a particularly attractive 
scheme of liability.l1 Additionally, because toxic tort cases are so com-
plex, they tend to be incredibly expensive to litigate. 12 For these rea-
A Review of Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse, 24 ENVTL. 
L. 1171, 1181 (1994). Environmentaljustice has also emerged as part of the agenda of civil rights 
groups and civic organizations, in law school curricula, and as the subject of studies by the EPA. 
See Kanner, supra note 1, at 505. 
4 Stella M. Capek, The "Environmental justice" Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Appli-
cation, 40 Soc. PROBS. 5, 8 (1993). 
5 See Kanner, supra note 1, at 506--07. 
6 See Pamela Duncan, Environmental Racism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TuL. 
ENVTL. LJ. 317, 355 (1993). 
7 "Toxic substances are any chemical, biological, biochemical or radioactive materials that 
cause an immediate or long-term harm to people, animals or the environment." Allan T. Slagel, 
Note, Medical Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort 
Victims, 63 IND. LJ. 849, 849 n.l (1988). 
8 See TOXIC TORTS AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: CHANGING TACTICS FOR CHANGING TIMES 11 
(Michael A. Brown ed. 1989). 
9 See ZYGMUNT ].B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 172 (1992). 
10 See id. at 173; Robert G. Blomquist, The Dangers of "General Observations" on Expert 
Scientific Testimony: A Comment on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 Ky. LJ. 703, 
713 (1994); Edward W. Kirsch, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Active judicial Scrutiny 
of Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 213, 233 (1995). 
II See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and their Effect on the 
Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1718 n.74 (1995). When several hazardous 
substances from different sources blend at one site, determining the percentage of fault of the 
various polluters may be nearly impossible. See id. Additionally, when an "invisible" injury does 
not manifest itself until years after exposure, as is often the case in asbestos litigation, it is difficult 
to pinpoint which source caused the harm at which time. See id. at 1745-46 n.247. In such cases, 
not using joint and several liability would be impractical. See id. 
12 See Slagel, supra note 7, at 870; Stephen]. Wenderoth, Comment, The Summary jury Trial 
and Toxic Tort Litigation, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 565, 577 (1989). 
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sons, toxic tort cases are especially vulnerable to many federal and state 
tort reform measures that limit class actions, contingency fee arrange-
ments, awards of damages, and the use of joint and several liability.13 
Environmental justice is often pursued through toxic tort suits,14 and 
is therefore particularly threatened by tort reform. 
In A Civil Action, Jonathan Harr provides a window through which 
to view the potential injustice of tort reform's effects on the poor and 
minority groupS.15 Harr, a journalist who had written for the New 
England Monthly and the New Haven Advocate, was given the idea for 
A Civil Action, his first book, by his friend and mentor, the writer Tracy 
Kidder.16 Kidder had heard about a toxic tort lawsuit in Woburn, 
Massachusetts, from one of the plaintiffs' lawyers. 17 Harr took the 
suggestion from Kidder, but decided not to focus on the plaintiffs 
themselves. Harr explained, "I knew I didn't want to write a book about 
toxic waste and dead children [because a history of a lawsuit would 
be] tedious and dull. I wanted to write about lawyers and the law, about 
people and how they work. "18 
As a result, A Civil Action is the narrative account of a lawyer's 
involvement with a toxic tort suit, a suit brought by the families of 
children in Woburn who contracted leukemia in the 1970s.19 The book 
is more, however, than a simple narrative. It serves as a warning against 
the call for tort reform that is sweeping our nation.20 Through the 
events chronicled in A Civil Action, Harr exposes the dangers of tort 
reform to socio-economically disadvantaged people who are injured 
and who seek environmental justice through toxic tort suits. 
Part II of this Book Review begins by describing the suit brought 
by the Woburn families. Part III outlines the particular danger to toxic 
tort victims that is posed by tort reforms that limit class actions. Part 
IV examines the impact of reforms that modifY the financial aspects of 
13 See infra parts III, IV, and V (discussion of proposed and enacted reforms). 
14 See Duncan, supra note 6, at 355. 
IS See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). 
16 See Michael Kenney, Coming Soon to a Theater Near You ... Wolntrn: The Legal Thriller, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1995, at 61, 61, 66. 
17 See Norman Oder, A 'Civil Action'for September, PUBLISHERS WKLY.,June 5, 1995, at 24,24. 
18Id. 
19 See generally HARR, supra note 15. 
20 See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress Struggles to Rewrite the Nation's 
Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done the Job, A.BA]., Aug. 1995, at 56,57. Besides federal 
legislation, state legislatures took up more than seventy new tort law bills in their 1995 sessions. 
See id. The many proponents of tort reform believe that the tort system must be overhauled to 
stop a litigation explosion that "has led to million-dollar judgments by irresponsible juries that 
judges will not control," and that has eroded the competitive edge of American business in the 
international marketplace. See id. at 58. 
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toxic tort suits. These reforms include caps on non-economic damages, 
caps on punitive damages, "loser pays" provisions, and limits on con-
tingency fee arrangements. Finally, Part V addresses proposals to mod-
ify or abolish joint and several liability and the effect of such proposals 
on toxic tort suits brought by poor or minority victims. 
II. THE LAWSUIT 
The events surrounding the Woburn case2! are not unusual for a 
toxic tort suit. The case began when a boy named Jimmy Anderson 
developed childhood leukemia in 1972.22 His mother, Anne Anderson, 
discovered that a dozen children in her neighborhood had leukemia, 
a number she later learned was at least seven times the national aver-
age.23 In 1979, the two public wells that supplied drinking water to the 
neighborhood were found to be contaminated with highly toxic indus-
trial solvents.24 Mrs. Anderson suspected a connection between the 
contaminated drinking water and the high rate of leukemia,25 but 
public health officials were unable to find a causal connection between 
the water and the disease.26 Mrs. Anderson and four other families 
decided to meet with a lawyer to "see what the possibilities [we]re."27 
Eventually, they and three more families hired a personal injury lawyer, 
Jan Schlictmann, on a contingency fee basis.28 
In 1982, the families filed suit against two corporations, W. R. 
Grace and Beatrice Foods, accusing them of polluting Woburn's water 
supply, and causing death and injury to their children.29 The complaint 
alleged that subsidiaries of Grace and Beatrice had poisoned the drink-
ing water in Woburn with toxic chemicals including trichloroethylene 
(TeE) .30 The poisoned water, according to the complaint, caused a 
cluster of leukemia, the deaths of five children, and injuries to all the 
family members who were party to the suit. 3! In addition to demanding 
21 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986). 
22 See HARR, supra note 15, at 14-15. 
23 See id. at 40, 50. In 1981, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health jointly released a report analyzing 
the increased incidence of childhood leukemia in the Andersons' neighborhood in Woburn. See 
id. at 49-50. 
24 See id. at 36. 
25 See id. at 21. 
26 See id. at 50. 
27Id. at 47. 
28 See id. at 47-48,67, 102, 149,441-42. 
29 See id. at 81. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
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compensation for the injuries to the children, the families demanded 
compensation for an increased risk of contracting leukemia, liver dis-
ease, central nervous system disorders, and other cancers and illnesses.32 
The families also demanded punitive damages for the ''willful'' and 
"grossly negligent" acts of the defendants.33 
The case was assigned to Judge Walter Jay Skinner, who bifurcated 
the triaP4 Under Skinner's trial model, the first stage of trial would 
address the issue of whether Beatrice and Grace were responsible for 
contaminating the wells.35 Then, if the jury found the defendants 
liable, the second stage would deal with the issue of whether the 
chemicals had caused any of the injuries.36 
At the end of the first stage of the trial, Skinner presented the jury 
with four questions: 1) "Had the plaintiffs established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that any of the following chemicals-TeE, perc, 
and 1, 2 transdichloroethylene-were disposed on the Beatrice land 
after August 27, 1968 (in the case ofW.R. Grace, after October 1,1964, 
the date Well G had opened), and had these chemicals substantially 
contributed to the contamination of the wells before May 22, 1979?"; 
2) "What, according to a preponderance of the evidence, was the 
earliest date-both the month and year-at which each of these chemi-
cals had substantially contributed to the contamination of the wells?"; 
3) "Had this happened because of the defendants' failure to fulfill any 
duty of care due to the plaintiffs?"; and 4) ''What, according to a 
preponderance of the evidence, was the earliest time (again, both the 
month and year) at which the substantial contribution referred to in 
question 3 was caused by the negligent conduct of this defendant?"37 
On the first question the jury determined that Grace had contami-
nated the wells, but that Beatrice had not.38 Thus, Beatrice was absolved 
of liability.39 The jury answered the second question on the date of 
contamination "Not Determined," the third question regarding whether 
the defendants had been negligent "Yes," and the fourth question 
asking for the date the negligence caused the contamination "Septem-
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 105, 286-87. 
35 See id. at 286-87. 
36 See id. 
37Id. at 368-69. 
38 See id. at 39l. 
39 See id. 
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ber 1973."40 Instead of proceeding to the second stage of the trial, 
Grace settled for $8 million.41 
The settlement money was divided between the families, the case 
expenses, and lawyers' fees. 42 Each of the eight plaintiff families received 
$455,000.43 Another $2.6 million covered case expenses.44 Schlictmann's 
firm received $2.2 million in fees, which was twenty-eight percent of 
the total settlement-an amount much lower than the forty-percent 
fee to which the families had originally agreed.45 The money went 
toward the salaries, benefits, and bonuses of the secretaries, associates, 
partners, and paralegals; a $350,000 referral fee to the lawyer originally 
contacted by the Woburn families; a $300,000 fee for the assistance of 
the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice; and a $1 million loan from the 
Bank of Boston.46 Schlictmann ended up with only $30,000.47 He owed 
his creditors $1,231,542.48 
Schlictmann attempted to appeal the case against Beatrice in 
vain.49 His petition for a rehearing at the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit was denied,50 as was his request for a writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,5l 
III. THE LEGAL ATTACK ON CLASS ACTIONS 
Jonathan Harr may never have had a case to write about if the 
families in Woburn had not been able to file a class action suit. Through 
the class action device, all toxic tort victims can join together into a 
single lawsuit.52 In a typical class action suit, a large class of persons 
40 See id. at 391-92. 
41 See id. at 451. 
42Id. at 453. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. For example, Schlictmann spent $88,729 for the services of a specialist in occupa-
tional and environmental medicine who reported on the differences in the families' health before 
and after the opening of the polluted wells. See id. at 200-01. A cardiologist from the Boston 
University School of Medicine charged $55,762 for a report on the plaintiffs' irregular heartbeats. 
See id. at 202-03. Schlictmann ordered a geological investigation of the area surrounding the 
wells which cost more than $500,000 and a $19,021 video of that investigation. See id. at 209,263. 
Aerial photographs of Woburn and an expert on aerial photography interpretation cost 
Schlictmann almost $15,000. See id. at 209-10. Interest on the debt Schlictmann owed to his 
creditors amounted to several hundred dollars per day. See id. at 263. 
45 See id. at 453. 
46 See id. at 454--55. 
47 See id. at 455. 
48 See id. at 491. 
49 See id. at 488-89. 
50 See id. at 488. 
51 See id. at 488-89. 
52 See PLATER, supra note 9, at 173. 
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who are similarly situated in regard to the case are represented by 
either a small group or a single member of the class.53 Toxic torts are 
frequently ideal for joined litigation because they often involve "mass 
torts" in which large numbers of individuals are injured through the 
same pattern of events.54 In fact, the majority of environmental cases 
are filed as class action suits.55 One reason that environmental cases 
are often filed as class actions is that joinder of parties and joinder of 
claims enable plaintiffs in expensive cases to pool their resources with 
those of other plaintiffs facing the same problem. 56 Additionally, judi-
cial efficiency is better served by joined or class actions.57 When only 
one lawsuit is filed on behalf of all the victims of the pollution, the 
basic underlying facts are resolved only once, which reduces the court's 
workload.58 
Although the only current federal reform that expressly restricts 
class actions applies solely to shareholder suits,59 less overt reforms have 
been successful in limiting the use of class actions by poor and minority 
people. The most obvious example of this trend is the attempt by the 
l04th Congress to eradicate the Legal Services Corporation.60 While 
the Legal Services Corporation was not totally eliminated, an amend-
ment to a spending bill now bars Legal Services lawyers from taking 
cases involving class actions.61 Second, rules against aggregating dis-
puted sums in order to meet minimum diversity requirements in fed-
eral court have discouraged the use of class actions. 62 These rules 
function to reduce court access63 of plaintiffs from diverse jurisdictions 
who have individually small irUuries, but collectively large ones. A third 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Kurt W. Anderson, From Capitol to Courthouse Litigators Face a Whole New Legislative 
Environment, PA. L. WKLY., Aug. 14, 1995, at S14. 
56 See PLATER, supra note 9, at 172. 
57 See id. at 173. 
58 See id. 
59 See Status of Major Legislation: l04th Congress, 53 CONGo Q., 3234, 3236 (1995). A typical 
shareholder lawsuit arises when the value of a company's stock drops precipitously. Disgruntled 
investors then sue the company, alleging that they were improperly lured into buying stock by 
misleading claims about future earnings and by the withholding of vital financial information. 
See id. In March 1995, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1058, which would 
limit suits by investors against companies. See Status of Major Legislation: l04th Congress, 54 CONGo 
Q., 74, 76 (1996). The United States Senate passed the provision in June ofl995. See id. President 
Clinton's veto of the measure was overridden in December of that year. See id. 
60 See Federal Legal Aid Agenl)l Survives Bid to End It, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1995, at 9. 
61 See id. 
62 See Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 
BROOK. L. REv. 827, 832 (1993). 
63 See id. at 831. 
140 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:133 
attack on the use of class actions is embodied in distribution of awards.64 
For example, in a recent California case, a superior court judge allowed 
a defendant to keep all the money that went unclaimed by members 
of the injured class, instead of requiring the unclaimed property to be 
turned over to the state as directed by statute.65 Actions such as this 
dramatically shrink66 the total award from which plaintiffs' attorneys 
may draw their contingency fees, thus further discouraging lawyers 
from bringing class action suits.67 
The viability of class actions is crucial to the success of toxic tort 
suits brought by poor plaintiffs. Without class actions, the first plaintiffs 
to bring suit may be the only ones to collect substantial punitive 
damages awards, an outcome which would affect the ability of other, 
equally deserving plaintiffs to recover for their injuries.68 The risk that 
a "first come, first serve" model of distribution will deplete a finite pool 
of award money is illustrated in New Jersey, where the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey held that under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unfair to subject 
defendants to the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for 
a single course of conduct.69 More fundamentally, when injury to a 
client is not extensive, the nominal damages potentially available to 
that client may not justifY the extensive legal work required to litigate 
a toxic tort claim.70 Realistically, a class action may be the only way to 
economically justifY the litigation.71 
For Anne Anderson and the other plaintiffs in the Woburn case, 
the availability of class action status was critical for success. If the 
plaintiffs had each been forced to bring separate suits and had not 
chosen to settle, Judge Skinner could have awarded punitive damages 
only to the first plaintiff.72 Additionally, the amount of potential dam-
ages to one of the families, as opposed to all of the families in the 
64 See, e.g., Scott Graham, Supreme Court Could Put a Crimp in Class Actions, THE RECORDER, 
Dec. 2, 1994, at 1. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. In the typical class action only about fifteen percent of the potential class members 
come forward. See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See Albert J. Slap & Alan C. Milstein, Punitive Damages in Toxic Tort Actions: Vindication 
for Victims, TRIAL, Nov. 1989, at 85, 86. 
69 See]uzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064-65 (D. NJ. 1989); Slap & 
Milstein, supra note 68, at 85. 
70 See Peter F. Langrock, Environmental Law: Class Action Litigation, TRIAL, Oct. 1989, at 46,47. 
71 See id. at 48. 
72 See Slap & Milstein, supra note 68, at 86. 
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aggregate, probably would not have attracted any lawyer to the case. 73 
Finally, not being able to pool either existing resources or anticipated 
recoveries would have precluded the families from funding the studies 
and hiring the experts they needed in order to prove complicated 
causation issues. 74 
IV. MONETARY ATTACKS 
In addition to reforms of class action suits, Congress and many 
state legislatures have passed laws that affect the financial aspects of 
toxic tort suits. 75 Three common reforms are caps on non-economic 
and punitive damages, "loser pays" provisions, and limitations on con-
tingency fee arrangements. 76 
A. Caps on Non-Economic and Punitive Damages 
A statutorily imposed cap on non-economic or punitive damages 
is one monetary-based reform that would have gravely affected the 
progress of the Woburn case. Fortunately for Anne Anderson and her 
neighbors, no such legislation was in place in 1982 when they filed suit 
against Beatrice and Grace. 
In March of 1995, the United States House of Representatives 
passed the Common Sense Legal Reform Act,77 a three-pronged pack-
age of tort reform bills designed to curb civillitigation.78 The United 
State Senate passed two prongs of the Act, one of which has become 
law, and the other of which was successfully vetoed by President Clin-
ton.79 The segment of the Act specifically dealing with civil litigation 
was placed on the Senate calendar on March 15, 1995, but no action 
has since taken place. so The civil litigation provision would apply to all 
73 See Langrock, supra note 70, at 47,48. 
74 See supra note 44 (discussion of case expenses). 
75 See Middleton, supra note 20, at 57. 
76 See id. 
77 See David Masci, Broad Changes Pass House, Face Harder Sell in Senate, 53 CONGo Q., 744, 
744 (1995); Mac Collins, Promises Made, Promise Kept, Contract with America, GOV'T PRESS 
RELEASES, Apr. 10, 1995, available in 1995 WL 14248093. The three parts of the Act are H.R. 956, 
the Product and Legal Reform Act; H.R. 988, the Attorney Accountability Act; and H.R. 1058, 
the Securities Litigation Reform Act. See Masci, supra at 744; Collins, supra. 
78 See Masci, supra note 77, at 744. 
79 See Status of Major Legislation: 104th Congress, 54 CONGo Q. 74, 76 (1996); Status of Major 
Legislation: 104th Congress, 54 CONGo Q. 2790, 2792 (1996). 
80 See Status of House Bills, CONGo INDEX, Jan. 19, 1996, at 35,016. 
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lawsuits in tort and would limit punitive damages to three times the 
amount of economic damages or $250,000, whichever is greater.8! 
The states are not waiting for federal reforms to take effect. Ac-
cording to the American Tort Reform Association of Washington, D.C., 
eighteen states82 have capped non-economic damages and thirty-one 
states83 have implemented reform of punitive damages, either by cap-
ping them, prohibiting them, or limiting them to findings of clear and 
convincing evidence.84 Several of these states acted as recently as 1995 
to limit non-economic and punitive damages,85 and two states enacted 
legislation in 1996.86 
81 See Anderson, supra note 55, at S14; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59; Tortologies, The 
Economist, Mar. 11, 1995, at 26. 
82 See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, 1996 TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS 3 (1996) 
[hereinafter TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS 1; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. The states which have 
capped non-economic damages in some form are Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS, supra, at 3; Middleton, supra 
note 20, at 59. 
83 See TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS, supra note 82, at 3; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. The 
states which have implemented reforms of punitive damages are Alabama, Alaska, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. See TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS, supra note 82, at 3; Middleton, supra note 
20, at 59. 
84 See Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. 
85 See Eleanor N. Bradley, State Reform of Tort Laws Proceeds During Calls for Federal Interven-
tion, U.S. L. WK.-DAILY EDITION, May 24,1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, U.S. Law Week 
Daily File. In March of 1995, Illinois enacted a law capping awards for non-economic damages 
at $500,000, and capping punitive damages at three times economic damages. See id. Texas 
enacted a law in April 1995 capping punitive damages awards at the greater of $200,000 or two 
times economic damages plus an amount equal to any non-economic damages up to $750,000. 
See id. A bill effective in Indiana since July 1995 caps punitive damages in civil lawsuits at three 
times compensatory damages or $50,000, whichever is greater. See id. Only twenty-five percent of 
any punitive damages award goes to the plaintiff, with the remainder applied to a compensation 
fund for victims of crime. See id. In May 1995, New Jersey enacted a cap on punitive damages of 
$350,000 or five times the amount of compensatory damages, whichever is greater. See id. New 
Jersey also limits punitive damages awards to instances where the plaintiff proves by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that the defendant showed "actual malice" or wanton and willful disregard 
for the resulting or potential harm. See id. 
86 See TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS, supra note 82, at 2, 3-4. Louisiana repealed the statute 
which authorized punitive damages to be awarded for wrongful handling of hazardous substances. 
See id. at 2. Ohio limited the amount of punitive damages recoverable from all parties except 
large employers to the lesser of three times the amount of compensatory damages or $100,000, 
and limited the amount of punitive damages recoverable from large employers to the greater of 
three times the amount of compensatory damages or $250,000. See id. at 3. Ohio also limited 
non-economic damages to the greater of $250,000 or three times the amount of economic 
damages, to a maximum of$500,000. See id. at 4. If certain permanent physical injures are present, 
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Limiting non-economic damages will have a negative effect on 
toxic tort cases. Many victims of hazardous waste dumping are poor.87 
People who are unemployed or have low incomes can prove only 
minimal economic damages, if any.88 Because they cannot prove sig-
nificant economic damages, the bulk of their pecuniary awards come 
from non-economic damages, such as emotional damages. These po-
tential plaintiffs are thus less attractive clients to lawyers working on a 
contingency fee basis when non-economic awards are limited by tort 
reform measures.89 
Similarly, capping or limiting punitive damages also has a chilling 
effect on the advancement of toxic tort cases. Because toxic tort cases 
involve high levels of complexity, difficulty, and expense, the availabil-
ity of punitive damages remains an important incentive for attorneys 
to take these cases.90 Additionally, some victims depend on punitive 
damages to cover losses that are not considered in trial, such as ill-
nesses that turn up in children of injured mothersYl The New Jersey 
Supreme Court elaborated on this use of punitive damages awards 
when it declared, "[O]ne of the underlying unwritten premises of 
awarding punitive damages is that plaintiffs are often under-compen-
sated by compensatory damages. Expenses of litigation, counsel fees, 
and expert fees are extremely high and burden plaintiffs."92 
Limiting punitive damages does not correspond to the concept of 
punishment that is the foundation of the doctrine.93 Capping punitive 
damages, requiring the amount of punitive damages to correspond to 
the amount of compensatory damages, or restricting punitive damages 
to a multiple of the compensatory award is illogical in toxic tort cases 
because sometimes, even egregious conduct will only yield slight com-
pensatory damages.94 Additionally, by "raising the standard of proof for 
punitive damages to conduct that is either intentional or reveals a 
'conscious, flagrant indifference' to the rights or safety of others," a 
however. Ohio limits non-economic damages to the greater of $1 million or $35,000 times the 
number of years remaining in the plaintiffs expected life. See id. 
87 See Rosen & Nolan, supra note 1, at 50. 
88 See Laura Duncan, Painful Decisions: New Business Risks Await Both Plaintiff and Defense 
Lawyers, A.B.A.]., Aug. 1995, at 66. 
89 See id. 
90 See Slap & Milstein, supra note 68, at 91. 
91 See Ross Ramsey, Victims Fear Tort Reform Laws Will Take Away Rights, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 
4, 1995, at A26. This particular concern was articulated by Gail Armstrong, the founder of the 
National Breast Implant Coalition. See id. 
92 Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 487 (NJ. 1986) (O'Hern,]., dissenting). 
93 See Slap & Milstein, supra note 68, at 85. 
94 See Jerry]. Phillips, Attacks on the Legal System, Fallacy of 'Tort Reform' Arguments, TRIAL, 
Feb. 1992, at 106, 107. 
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defendant could be released from liability for acts that are reckless or 
that result from gross negligence.95 Thus, some egregious conduct 
would not be compensable at all. Finally, the general absurdity of 
capping or otherwise legislating a set amount for punitive damages has 
been appreciated for well over a century. In 1852, the Supreme Court 
stated that determining the amount of punitive damages "has been always 
left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus 
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case. ''96 
If their case had not settled, the Woburn families would have 
needed an award of non-economic damages, punitive damages, or 
both to be fully compensated for their loss. First, hospital bills did not 
reflect the pain and suffering felt by the families of the sick and dying 
children.97 Second, at the time of the suit, the plaintiffs did not know 
if any more of their family members would fall ill as a result of Grace's 
and Beatrice's dumping of contaminants. Punitive damages awards 
could have been used to defray the costs of those unknown future 
illnesses.98 Finally, the simple fact that they would have only been able 
to prove a small amount of economic damages would have made them 
unattractive clients for Schlictmann, who needed a large recovery to 
offset his expenses.99 
B. "Loser Pays" 
Another financially-aimed reform that seriously hampers class ac-
tion toxic tort suits is the "loser pays" arrangement, whereby the "los-
ing" party pays for the ''winner's'' legal fees.lOo Such a provision, had it 
been in place at the time, would have greatly increased the risks of 
litigation for the Woburn plaintiffs. 
As part of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, in March of 1995 
the United States House of Representatives passed the Attorney Ac-
countability Act, a bill which includes a proposal popularly known as 
the "loser pays" proposal, or "English rule. "101 The Attorney Account-
95 See Mark Hansen, Changes Put Goals of Tort Law in Doubt, A.B.A. j., Aug. 1995, at 64, 65. 
96Dayv. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852). 
97 See Hope Viner Samborn, Plaintiffs Often Pay a Price for Reform, A.B.A. j., Aug. 1995, at 
68,69. 
98 See Ramsey, supra note 91, at A26. 
99 See Duncan, supra note 88, at 66. 
100 See Bad Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at A18. 
101 See Tortologies, supra note 81, at 26. The "loser pays" provision is also known as the "English 
rule" because the English rule of costs forces losers in certain cases to pay the winners' legal fees. 
See id. 
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ability Act was placed on the Senate calendar in March of 1995, but 
no further action has been taken. 102 The "loser pays" measure would 
apply to diversity cases brought in federal court and require that the 
party who rejects a settlement offer pay at least a portion of the other 
party's legal costs if the damages awarded at trial are lower than the 
amount of the rejected offer. 103 The "loser" would be required to pay 
even if she or he actually won the case but was awarded a sum smaller 
than the other party's last offer. 104 The amount the "loser" must pay 
would be limited to an amount no greater than the "loser's" own legal 
fees and would only cover fees incurred after the last settlement offer. !Os 
At the state level, only Indiana currently has a "loser pays" rule. 106 
Indiana's rule provides that a party rejecting a settlement offer is liable 
for up to $lOOO of the opposing side's legal fees and costs if the award 
at trial is less than the rejected settlement offer. 107 At least one propo-
nent of the Indiana law, which has been effective since July 1995, 
originally wanted it to be stricter, with a potential obligation of $5000.108 
The "loser pays" proposal would have an adverse impact on toxic 
tort suits. According to Merrill Davidoff, an attorney with the Philadel-
phia firm Berger & Montague, a plaintiff with a meritorious case could 
still lose if she or he could not prove all of her or his claims, and would 
thus be leery of initiating litigation. 109 Additionally, Davidoff maintains 
that "if the loser pays for every lawsuit, anyone who is not wealthy would 
be dissuaded from filing."llo Phillip H. Corboy, Chair of the American 
Bar Association Special Committee on Medical Professional Liability, 
notes that a defendant would be entitled to have the plaintiff pay its 
attorney fees even if that defendant wrongfully harmed the plaintiff, 
as long as the verdict is lower than the defendant's last offer.lll Con-
sumer groups and the American Bar Association also oppose the "loser 
pays" proposal because it would deny legal access to citizens who, 
despite having serious legal complaints, cannot risk having to pay their 
102 See Status of House Bills. CONGo INDEX, Jan. 19, 1996, at 35,016. 
103 See Anderson, supra note 55, at 814; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59; Tortologies, supra 
note 81, at 26. 
104 See Tortologies, supra note 81, at 26. 
105 See Anderson, supra note 55, at 814; Tortologies, supra note 81, at 26. 
106 See Barbara Franklin, Learning Curve: Lawyers Must Confront Impact of Changes on Litiga-
tion Strategies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 62, 63. 
107 See id. 
108 See Bradley, supra note 85. 
109 See Anderson, supra note 55, at 814. 
110Id. 
III See Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. 
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opponents' legal costs if they lose. 112 The United States Supreme Court 
has recognized the injustice of the "loser pays" arrangemen t. 113 In 1967, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren warned that "[s]ince litigation is at best 
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prose-
cuting a lawsuit, and ... the poor might be unjustly discouraged from 
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing 
included the fees of their opponents' counsel."l14 According to G. Marc 
Whitehead, chair emeritus of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman 
in Minneapolis, even the English recognize the injustice in their "loser 
pays" system. ll5 While legislatures in the United States have been lim-
iting access to the court system, he reports, England is preparing to 
adopt a contingent fee system "because they do not believe you can 
achieve civil justice, changes in unsafe products, safe workplaces, a 
clean environment, without an American-style contingent fee system 
where people have access to the courts. "116 
Jonathan Harr also criticizes the proposal, since a poor plaintiff, 
or even one of modest income, would face far worse odds against a 
rich defendant under the "loser pays" scheme. ll7 As Harr explains, 
"Corporations can afford to take the risk, but for someone already 
suffering an injury or loss, the provision makes the act of entering a 
courtroom more like a double-or-nothing bet at a poker table. "118 Anne 
Anderson and the other plaintiffs in the Woburn case present the 
perfect example of Harr's concern. None of the families came close 
to being wealthy. Certainly, if they had turned down Grace's settlement 
offer, and if Grace had prevailed at trial, they could not have afforded 
Grace's $7 million legal fees.ll9 In fact, if they had been subject to a 
"loser pays" provision, the plaintiffs would have had to pay millions for 
Beatrice's fees because Schlictmann had refused Beatrice's $1 million 
settlement offer and Beatrice was later absolved of liability.120 Neither 
112 See Bad Justice, supra note 100, at A18. 
113 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 7I 4, 718 (1967). 
114Id. 
liS See Public Discontent: The Debate Goes Beyond Tort Law; It"s About Lawyers, A.B.A. j., Aug. 
1995, at 70, 7l. 
116Id. 
117 See Jonathan Harr, Whose Court Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at A19. 
118Id. In a double-or-nothing poker bet, a player bets twice as much as was previously bet 
and lost. See ALBERT H. MOREHEAD ET AL., THE NEW COMPLETE HOYLE REVISED 679 (1991). In 
Harr's analogy, a plaintiff "bets" the cost of both parties' legal fees in addition to the amount 
already lost as a result of an injury. See Harr, supra note 117, at A19. 
119 See HARR, supra note 15, at 454. 
120 See id. at 230-31,286,391,454. At one point, Beatrice's lawyer, Jerome Facher, may have 
offered Schlictmann $20 million, and Schlictmann may have turned it down. See id. at 23l. 
Facher was exasperated. "I don't understand why you won't give me a number, 
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the families nor Schlictmann could afford to take such a risk. Had they 
faced a "loser pays" provision, they may never have filed suit, or may 
have settled early for an amount far less than their damages. 
C. Contingency Fees 
Limiting the availability of contingency fee arrangements is an 
additional financially-based reform that poses a grave threat to plain-
tiffs like those in the Woburn case. No such reform was in place, 
however, when the Woburn families filed suit against Beatrice and 
Grace. 
The Manhattan Institute, a conservative public-policy research 
organization funded by "corporate heavyweights,"121 recently circulated 
a proposal to significantly revise standard contingency fee schedules. 122 
While the proposal does not call for an end to contingency fees,123 it 
would prohibit charging contingency fees against settlement offers 
made before a plaintiffs retention of counselor when a settlement 
offer is accepted within sixty days of a plaintiffs notice of a suit. 124 If a 
plaintiff rejects a defendant's offer, her or his lawyer's fee "is the 
bargained for contingent fee rate applied to the excess over the re-
jected early offer plus an hourly rate fee for the recovery up to the 
amount of the early offer. "125 The proposal does not contemplate altering 
contingency fees in cases where there is no offer within sixty days.126 
Id. 
any goddamn number." He reached into his hip pocket, pulled out his wallet, and 
slapped a twenty-dollar bill on his desk. He leaned back in his chair. "What if I put 
six zeros on the end of that. Would you take it?" 
Twenty million dollars. 
Schlictmann laughed but did not answer Facher's question. 
121 See David Foppert, Ruling Out High Fees, BEST'S REV.-PROP.-CASUALTY INS. EDITION,July 
1994, at 38, 38. Among the Manhattan Institute's more than 1000 contributors are Aetna Life & 
Casualty Co., General Electric, Bankers Trust Co., and Johnson &Johnson. See id. 
122 See id. The Manhattan Institute's proposal was circulated directly to states in an effort to 
encourage them to enact reform quickly. See Daniel J. Murphy, Bellying Up to Plaintiffs' Bar: 
Democrat Lawmakers Get Millions from Lawyers, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 12, 1994, at AI. State 
Supreme Courts were urged to adopt the proposal under their authority to regulate the practice 
oflaw. See Lester Brickman, Limiting Lawyers' Unearned, Windfall Fees, N.Y. Lj., Aug. 4, 1994, at 
5. At least one state was inspired by the Manhattan Institute's plan: a 1995 California ballot 
initiative to limit contingency fees was based on the proposal. See Robert Stowe England, Ambu-
lance Chaser Alert: Next March, California Voters Hope to Kick Off a Nationwide Movement to Rein 
in Lawyers' Fees, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 10, 1995, at 28, available in 1995 WL 8083312. 
123 See Foppert, supra note 121, at 38-39. 
124 See Brickman, supra note 122, at 5. 
125Id. 
126 See id. 
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Proposals similar to the Manhattan Institute's have been circulat-
ing for at least a decade. 127 In the mid-eighties, an alliance of insurance 
companies, governments, and manufacturers proposed lowering the 
maximum contingency fee a plaintiffs lawyer could charge. 128 The 
executive branch of the United States government has also proposed 
to alter contingency fee arrangements. 129 Ronald Reagan's administra-
tion sought to substitute a steep sliding scale in place of a set percentage 
for contingency fees, allowing lawyers to claim, for example, twenty-five 
percent of the first $100,000 of a plaintiffs award or settlement, but 
only ten percent for amounts above $300,000,130 
The continued availability of the contingency fee arrangement is 
integral to poor plaintiffs' quest for justice in the courts. Philip H. 
Corboy, Chair of the American Bar Association Special Committee on 
Medical Professional Liability, points out that precisely because a po-
tential plaintiff is injured, she or he is less likely than at any other time 
to be able to afford hourly fees. 131 Additionally, he notes that because 
a well-prepared trial can be very expensive, almost every plaintiff is 
"indigent" when it comes to paying the full cost of quality trial advo-
cacy.132 This is especially true when compared to the wealthy corpora-
tions that many toxic tort victims sue. Not only do corporations have 
the money for top-of-the-line legal defense, but their lawyers' legal fees 
are also not currently subject to any tort reform proposals.133 More 
fundamentally, simply finding a lawyer to take a mass toxic tort suit 
would be more difficult without the possibility of paying through a 
contingency fee. 134 When contingency fees are limited, lawyers are 
disinclined to take cases, even when they are strong.135 Even if the only 
limitation on the fee were a sliding scale, lawyers would be less inclined 
to take risks on large recoveries, such as those in many toxic tort class 
actions. 136 
127 See generally Stephen Gillers, The Real Stakes in Tort Reform, THE NATION, July 19/26,1986. 
128 See id. at 41. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 See Foppert, supra note 121, at 42. 
132 See id. 
133 See Gillers, supra note 127, at 41. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. Limits based on a sliding scale may pose their own risk of exacerbating the conflict 
of interest which is inherent in the contingent fee arrangement. See Richard M. Birnholz, 
Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 V.C.LA L. REv. 949, 980-81 
(1990). At some point along the sliding scale, the lawyer's "marginal return per add hour" will 
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The plaintiffs in the Woburn case would have been severely af-
fected by a limitation on contingency fee arrangements. Their case 
expenses amounted to $2.6 million, and Schlictmann's legal fees came 
to another $2.2 million. 137 Although not destitute, the families certainly 
did not have funds to pay these kinds of expenses. From the time suit 
was filed to the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, Schlictmann 
spent eight years on the case. 138 If Schlictmann had been hired on an 
hourly fee basis, his bill would have been astronomical. Even if the 
plaintiffs had been able to hire Schlictmann on a contingency fee basis, 
the plaintiffs would have been disadvantaged if that arrangement had 
been limited in some fashion. It is not likely that Schlictmann or any 
other lawyer would have taken such a risky case if her or his potential 
recovery were not substantial. A limitation on contingency fees would 
have effectively barred the Woburn families from ever bringing suit. 
V. THE ATTACK ON JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
Joint and several liability is another common target of reform 
proposals that affect toxic tort suits brought by poor plaintiffs. Tort law 
employs the doctrine of joint and several liability when one or more 
parties' actions converge and cause a single, indivisible injury to a 
plaintiff.139 Under this doctrine, each defendant is potentially liable for 
the entire damages award, even though each one's individual contri-
bution to the harm is less than one hundred percent. 140 If one defen-
dant is judgment proof and its share of the judgment is not collectible, 
the remaining defendants must assume responsibility for the entire 
judgment award, even if they were only minimally at fault.141 
Reforms of joint and several liability have been proposed and 
implemented on many fronts. At the federal level, a provision of the 
House version of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act would have 
eliminated joint and several liability for non-economic damages in all 
tort lawsuits, including those filed in state courts.142 President Clinton 
fall below her or his "marginal cost," which may cause the lawyer to not exert the effort necessary 
to maximize the client's net recovery. See id. 
137 See HARR, supra note 15, at 453. 
138 See id. at 81, 487-89. 
139 See PLATER, supra note 9, at 176. 
140 See Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of joint and Several Liability, 23 
TORT & INS. LJ. 482, 482 (1988) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAw OF TORTS § 47 (5th ed. 1984». 
141 See id. 
142 See Anderson, supra note 55, at S14; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. 
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successfully vetoed the conference version of that bill, which would 
have abolished joint and several liability for non-economic losses only 
in product liability suits. 143 The states, on the other hand, have been 
successful in their efforts to modify joint and several liability. In the 
mid-1980s, about half the states enacted legislation to alter traditional 
joint and several liability.!44 According to the American Tort Reform 
Association of Washington, D.C., forty-two states have modified or 
abolished joint and several liability since 1986.145 To date, only eight 
states have abstained from reforming joint and severalliability.!46 
Several of the forty-two states that have modified or abolished joint 
and several liability were active in this area of tort reform as recently 
as 1995. In Texas, legislation effective September 1,1995, altered joint 
and several liability by making a defendant liable for all damages only 
if the defendant is at least fifty-one percent liable for an injury.147 In 
toxic tort cases the threshold is fifteen percent.148 Previously, Texas's 
levels for liability were one percent for toxic torts and ten percent in 
all other torts. 149 Proponents of tort reform in Texas's 1995 legislative 
session sought to abolish joint and several liability entirely, while op-
ponents fought to keep the "environmental exception. "150 A compro-
mise was offered at fifteen percent, and the Texas legislature finally 
agreed on that percentage.151 Another state that acted recently is Illi-
nois, which totally eliminated the concept of joint and several liability 
143 See Allan Freedman, Conference Highlights, 54 CONGo Q. 690, 690 (1996); Status of Majar 
Legislation, 54 CONGo Q. 2790, 2792 (1996). 
144 See Phillips, supra, note 94, at 107. 
145 See AMERICAN TORT REFORM AsSOCIATION, TORT REFORM RECORD 7 (1996) [hereinafter 
TORT REFORM RECORD]; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. 
146 See TORT REFORM RECORD, supra note 145, at 7; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. The 
states that have not reformed joint and several liability are Arkansas, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. See TORT REFORM 
RECORD, supra note 145, at 7; Middleton, supra note 20, at 59. However, that list may shrink soon: 
as of August 1995, limits on joint and several liability were being considered in Pennsylvania. See 
Anderson, supra note 55, at S14. 
147 See Walt Borges, Reality of Tort Reform: A Rush to File, New Clout far the Defense, TEX. LAW., 
May 8,1995, at 1 [hereinafter Reality of Tart Reform]; Walt Borges, Tart Reform Becomes a Package 
Deal; Bills Sent to Senate as Consumer Lawyers Rue DTPA Losses, TEX. LAW., May 8, 1995, at 11 
[hereinafter Package Deal]; Constance E. Courtney, Joint and Several Liamlity; A New Day far 
Environmental Counsel; The 15 Percent Threshold Will Make it Tougher for Plaintiffs to Go after 
Marginally Liable ''Deep Pockets" in Toxic Tart Cases, TEX. LAw., Aug. 28, 1995, at 26. 
148 See Reality of Tart Refarm, supra note 147, at 1; Package Dea~ supra note 147, at 11, 
Courtney, supra note 147, at 26. 
149 See Reality of Tart Refarm, supra note 147, at 1. 
150 See Courtney, supra note 147, at 26. 
151 See id. 
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in March 1995.152 Two months later, Wisconsin adopted a law limiting 
joint and several liability.153 Under Wisconsin's old provision, defen-
dants in a tort case would only have to be found one percent liable for 
a plaintiffs injuries before they would be liable to pay the entire 
damages award. 154 The new law changes the threshold for liability to 
fifty-one percent. 155 
Louisiana and Ohio both enacted reforms of joint and several 
liability in 1996.156 Louisiana's law abolishes joint and several liability 
in all civil actions, leaving defendants liable only for damages propor-
tional to their assigned degrees of fault. 157 Ohio abolished joint and 
several liability with one exception.158 Under Ohio's law, defendants 
who are more than fifty percent at fault are jointly liable for economic 
damages only.159 
Toxic torts are not always included in reforms of joint and several 
liability. Some states, including Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Washington, have 
recognized that joint and several liability is central to the success of 
toxic tort suits.160 As a result, certain types of toxic torts have been 
excluded from these states' dramatic modifications to the doctrine of 
joint and severalliability.161 
152 See Bradley, supra note 85. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS, supra note 82, at 2, 4. 
157 See id. at 2. 
158 See id. at 4. 
159 See id. 
160 See Eggen, supra note 11, at 1718 n.75. 
161 See id. Arizona exempts causes of action relating to hazardous wastes or solid waste disposal 
sites. See id. Idaho exempts actions "arising out of a violation of any state or federal law or 
regulation relating to hazardous or toxic waste or substances or solid waste disposal sites." See id. 
Illinois exempts actions involving hazardous waste or environmental pollution, except claims 
against response action contractors. See id. Minnesota exempts any claim arising out of the 
violation of an environmental or public health law. See id. Nevada exempts actions arising from 
"emission, disposal or spillage of a toxic or hazardous substance." See id. New Jersey currently 
exempts actions seeking damages for personal injuries or death where the cause of the damages 
is the negligent manufacture, use, disposal, handling, storage, or treatment of hazardous or toxic 
substances. See id. New York exempts actions arising from releases into the environment of 
hazardous substances or hazardous waste. See id. Oregon exempts actions arising out of the 
violation of state or federal standards for air pollution, hazardous waste, hazardous substances, 
or radioactive waste. See id. Texas exempts actions arising from the depositing, discharge, or 
release into the environment of any hazardous or harmful substance. See id. Washington exempts 
actions arising from hazardous waste or substances or solid waste disposal sites. See id. Hawaii's 
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As in many toxic tort cases, joint and several liability was appro-
priate in the Woburn case. In both the Woburn case and in most toxic 
tort cases, several defendants may have contributed to the pollution in 
question.162 In fact, cases like the Woburn case are usually cited as the 
classic argument for joint and several liability because they involve 
numerous chemicals that have commingled and changed from their 
original composition.163 Without joint and several liability, the Woburn 
plaintiffs would have had to attempt to apportion the harm they suf-
fered, a practically impossible task given their indivisible injury. 164 Joint 
and several liability serves to relieve the burden of difficult causation 
problems such as these, which are typically associated with toxic tort 
litigation. 165 
Finally, if the Woburn plaintiffs had not been able to utilize the 
doctrine of joint and several liability, Grace and Beatrice would have 
been free to point the finger at each other. This finger-pointing would 
have made both settlement and trial more difficult for Schlictmann. If 
he had settled with one defendant, the remaining defendant could 
have attempted to place the blame on the first defendant at trial, 
leaving it to Schlictmann to, in effect, defend the settling party.166 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tort reform's agenda of controlling frivolous lawsuits is an in-
sufficient reason to deny the protection of the court system to poor or 
minority victims of toxic torts. That tort reforms might obstruct plain-
tiffs' quests for environmental justice is evidenced by statements of A 
Civil Action's protagonist: Jan Schlictmann says he never would have 
considered taking the Woburn case if the proposed federal tort re-
forms had existed in 1983.167 The case was too complicated and expen-
exemption for toxic and asbestos-related torts and torts relating to environmental pollution 
expired in October 1995 by statutory mandate. See id. 
Additionally, a recent proposal in New Jersey would expand its current exception. See 
Anderson, supra note 55, at S14. Currentiy, New Jersey exempts toxic torts from the general 
elimination of joint and several liability. See Eggen, supra note 11, at 1718 n.75. The current bill 
would require that solvent defendant~ in toxic tort cases share damages with co-defendants who 
are bankrupt whenever the solvent defendants are responsible for more than five percent of the 
total damages. See Anderson, supra note 55, at S14. 
162 See RARR, supra note 15, at 78, 81; Eggen, supra note 11, at 1718 n.74. 
163 See Courtney, supra note 147, at 26. 
164 See Steenson, supra note 140, at 483. 
165 See Peter Obstier, Toward a Working Solution to Global Pollution: Importing CERCLA to 
Regulate the Export of Hazardous Waste, 16 YALE]. INT'L L. 73, 121-22 (1991). 
166 See Franklin, supra note 106, at 64. 
167 See Rarr, supra note 117, at A19. 
1996] BOOK REVIEWS 153 
sive to prepare, he contends, and the families were not wealthy enough 
to pay for the litigation costS.168 
Because their progress was not impeded by tort reform, the citi-
zens of Woburn were able to access the court system and recover some 
of their damages. A message of A Civil Action, however, is that future 
victims of similar injustice may not be so lucky. In Jonathan Harr's 
words, "The Woburn case is an example of the way the courts are 
supposed to work. The Republicans' bill would dismantle a system that 
isn't perfect, but one that gives both citizens and corporations their 
day in court. "169 
The Woburn case is indeed an example. Through the events 
chronicled in A Civil Action, the reader can see the dangers of tort 
reform to poor people who are injured by hazardous waste. The Woburn 
case was a mass tort of staggering complexity that was incredibly ex-
pensive to litigate. It involved multiple defendants and several victims, 
and was brought as class action by a lawyer working on a contingency 
fee basis. Many of the families' injuries were indivisible. Because of 
these characteristics, the Woburn case serves as a consummate illustra-
tion of the vulnerability of toxic tort cases to many tort reform meas-
ures that limit class actions, contingency fee arrangements, awards of 
damages, and the use of joint and several liability. 
168 See id. 
169Id. 
